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Recently, much attention has been given to the fact that unemployment is
higher for low skilled workers than for highly educated workers. However,
little focus has been given to the fact that di⁄erent employment perspectives
exist for di⁄erent groups of highly educated workers. As the educational
choice of today￿ s young generation determines the skill composition and hence
the production possibilities of tomorrow￿ s labour force, which type of higher
education individuals choose becomes an important issue. The increasing
competition for the location of production to low-cost countries further ac-
tualizes industrialized countries￿focus on high-skilled labor and its compo-
sition. However, although the skill combination is essential for a country￿ s
economic performance, governments encourage individuals to get higher ed-
ucation while to a great extent ignoring which type of higher education they
acquire.
This paper examines the link between a country￿ s tax system and the skill
composition of the work force, and shows that income taxes might increase
the skill mismatch in the society and increase total unemployment. The
presence of labor income taxes induces more high-ability individuals to choose
an educational type with high consumption value. Correspondingly, fewer
high-ability individuals choose to acquire the educational type that requires
more e⁄ort than in the absence of taxes.
By introducing the concept of human capital, Schultz (1960) and Becker
(1964) introduced a shift in the economic literature into considering educa-
tion as an investment that yields higher wages later in life. Prior to this,
education was considered a cultural good, and there was emphasis on the
non-pecuniary returns to a job or an education, as seen in Marshall (1920).
The recent literature on the economics of education to a great extent ignores
non-pecuniary returns and costs when modeling the educational decision.
Di⁄erent educational directions are associated with di⁄erent pecuniary
and non-pecuniary costs and returns. Wage levels vary substantially across
occupations and sectors, as do unemployment rates. The individual￿ s innate
ability level determines both the e⁄ort required to complete a speci￿c edu-
cation and the wage return to this particular education. His consumption
value of an educational type depends on the individual speci￿c preferences.
The consumption value of education, among other things, consists of the joy
of learning new things, meeting new people, moving to a new city, and en-
joying life as a student, in addition to the increased status in society that
2often comes with studying in particular ￿elds. In addition, education also
brings a consumption value in the future, since it quali￿es the individual to
work in his preferred profession. Non-pecuniary returns can be important
motivations for the individual￿ s educational choice. Alstads￿ter (2004) esti-
mates that Norwegian teacher￿ s college graduates￿willingness to pay for the
consumption value of this educational type was at least 38 % of the present
value of their potential lifetime income. Also, Walker and Zhu (2003) report
a negative wage return to an arts degree in the UK, while the positive wage
return to an engineering degree is substantial. This could mean that art
graduates have a large positive consumption value of this educational type,
such that they are willing to forego earnings by not choosing engineering.
These foregone earnings are then the price on the consumption value of an
arts degree. But it is also possible that the e⁄ort costs of completing an
engineering degree would have been so high for the arts major that they for
that reason decide against it.1
In the economic literature, surprisingly little attention has been given to
the question of how the tax system a⁄ects the individual￿ s choice of educa-
tional direction, and even less attention has been given to the consequences
for a country￿ s skill composition. More work has been done on the e⁄ects of
taxes on the level of educational attainment when education is a homogenous
investment alternative; Boskin (1975), Heckman (1976), Dri¢ l and Rosen
(1983), and Nielsen and Słrensen (1997).2
Alstads￿ter (2003) was the ￿rst to explicitly analyze the tax e⁄ects on
the type of educational attainment, and she argues that a higher wage tax
might induce students to choose more of the educational type with high
consumption value. The model was set in partial equilibrium. Malchow-
Młller and Skaksen (2003) expand the framework set out in Alstadsaeter
(2003). They consider identical workers who decide on on how to allocate
their time between productive and non-productive education and leisure.
They show that it can be optimal to have regressive labour taxation and
high uniform tuition fees.
1As both ability and preferences are important in the educational choice, some individ-
uals with low e⁄ort costs when acquiring engineering may also have higher consumption
value from this educational type. These individuals then enjoy both a high wage return
and a high non-pecuniary return to their chosen type of education.
2Much work has also been done on tax e⁄ects on occupational choice, in particular
regarding the choice between being an entrepreneur or employee; Pestieu and Possen
(1991), Parker (1996), Bruce (2000), and Gentry and Hubbard (2000).
3Also the present paper expands on Alstads￿ter (2003) and develops a
simple equilibrium model that captures some important dimensions of the
educational choice when the level of education is given. Education is both
investment and consumption. Individuals with heterogenous ability levels
choose among two educational types. The ￿rst type yields a positive con-
sumption value, but has long expected unemployment spells and a modest
wage return. The second type yields a higher wage return, shorter expected
unemployment spells, but requires an ability-dependent e⁄ort to complete.
Wages are set through wage bargains and unemployment features in equilib-
rium. The wage returns net of taxes and the expected unemployment spells
are thus endogenously determined and are important factors when individu-
als decide on their educational direction.
Proportional income taxes increase the importance of non-pecuniary re-
turns and costs for the choice of educational direction by reducing the im-
portance of expected wage returns. This is because the consumption value
and e⁄ort cost are tax exempt returns and costs to education. We show that
taxes distort the individuals￿educational choices, such that too few high-
ability workers choose the educational direction that requires e⁄ort, and too
many high-ability workers choose the educational direction associated with
a positive consumption value. This, in turn, implies that too many individ-
uals choose an educational type associate with long expected unemployment
spells. The result is that unemployment is higher than it would have been if
individuals chose the socially optimal educational portfolio. The distortion
can however be corrected for either by imposing higher tuition fees on ed-
ucational types with high consumption values or by subsidizing educational
types that require high e⁄ort to complete. Di⁄erentiated tax rates can also
be used to correct for this distortion.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the two-sector model
employing two di⁄erent educational types is described and we consider the
impact on educational direction and total unemployment from proportional
labour taxation. Section 3 considers welfare, concluding that proportional
taxation distorts the educational decision and thus reduces welfare. The fol-
lowing section evaluates whether di⁄erentiated taxes may be used to correct
for this distortion, and we consider the impact of tax di⁄erentiation on ed-
ucational direction and total unemployment. In Section 5 we examine the
same issues by extending the model with di⁄erentiated tuition fees and sub-
sidies. A discussion is provided in Section 6. Finally we conclude in section
7.
42 The model
Consider an economy where workers may choose to acquire two di⁄erent
types of higher education of the same duration, type c and type e. It is
not necessarily the case that the two types of education provide workers
with di⁄erent productivities. However, educational type c brings the worker
a higher consumption value than educational type e. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, we introduce this e⁄ect in our model by letting
the consumption value of acquiring education e be zero and the consumption
value of education c be positive. On the other hand, education e is associated
with higher educational e⁄ort costs than education c. Again, without loss
of generality, we introduce this e⁄ect by letting educational costs associated
with education c be zero and the educational costs associated with sector e
be positive.
Workers di⁄er in ability, a, which is known to the individual and is, with-
out loss of generality, assumed to be uniformly distributed across individuals.
Educational e⁄ort costs, ￿(a), are decreasing in ability, ￿0 (a) < 0. That is,
the higher innate ability, the less e⁄ort is required in order to attain educa-
tion of type e. The consumption value of type c education is the same for all
individuals.3 The choice of educational type is discrete, such that individuals
choose to acquire either education of type c or education of type e.
There are two sectors in the economy, where sector c employs workers
with educational type c and sector e employs workers with educational type
e. The two sectors di⁄er in the sense that sector e provides workers with
better employment perspectives. The better employment perspectives both
include high wages and low unemployment probabilities. As both those vari-
ables are endogenously determined in the model, we establish these relative
values by either higher productivity in sector e or lower separation rates from
employment in sector e. This corresponds to higher expected pecuniary pay-
o⁄s in sector e; as wages are higher and workers will spend more time in
3Note that we could alternatively assume that workers di⁄er with respect to prefer-
ences over the consumption value of education c. With the normalization of letting the
consumption value of educational type e be zero, then a would denote di⁄erent preferences
for the consumption value of educational type c. The function ￿(a) then captures utility
gain of educational type c where ￿0(a) < 0 captures that utility falls with the preference
parameter a. That is, workers with high a have a smaller consumption value of educational
type c than individuals with a low a. The same results as we present in the paper below
would then materialize.
5employment during a working life.
We now proceed by setting up a two-sector matching equilibrium model
along the lines of Pissarides (2000) that captures the individual￿ s educational
decision described above.
2.1 Workers and ￿rms
Unemployed workers search for jobs in sector c or sector e depending on
which type of education they acquire. The matching process in each sector
is captured by a concave, constant-returns-to-scale matching function,
Hj = h(vj;uj); j = c;e;
where Hj is the matching rate, vj is the vacancy rate, and uj is the un-
employment rate. The rates are de￿ned as the numbers relatively to the
labour force of the speci￿c type. The transition rate into employment for a
worker of type j is given by ￿j = Hj=uj = h(￿j;1) = ￿(￿j), where ￿j =
vj
uj;
captures sectorial labour market tightness. The rate at which vacant jobs
become ￿lled is qj = Hj=vj = h(1;1=￿j) = q (￿j). Consequently, we have
￿(￿j) = ￿jq (￿j), where ￿
0 (￿j) = q (￿j)(1 ￿ ￿ (￿j)) > 0 and q0 (￿j) < 0.
￿ 2 (0;1) is the elasticity of the expected duration of a vacancy with respect
to ￿j, i.e., ￿ (￿j) = q0 (:)￿j=q (:). Higher labour market tightness in a sec-
tor, ￿j; increases the likelihood of a worker in that sector ￿nding a job, but
reduces the likelihood for a ￿rm ￿nding a worker.
Workers who choose to acquire education of type c enjoy a positive con-
sumption value, where d is the imputed monetary value of this consumption
value.4
Let Uc and Ec denote the expected present values of unemployment and
employment for a worker who has acquired type c education. The value
4As discussed in the introduction, this non-pecuniary returns could include returns
while in education such as the joy of learning new things, meeting new people, moving
to a new city, and enjoying life as a student, but it could also include returns received
after the education is ￿nished such as status in society, having a fun job etc. Both these
interpretations are valid in our model although we, for simplicity, impute the consumption
value of type c education as a ￿ ow value in equations (1) and (2) below. The assumption
enables us to use a model without having workers continuously being born and dying.
Such a model would, however, generate the same qualitative results. The same holds for
the interpretations of the e⁄ort costs in equations (3) and (4) below.
6functions for a worker i with type c education who is paid wci then reads:
rEci = R + wci (1 ￿ t) ￿ sc(Eci ￿ Uc) + d; (1)
rUc = R + ￿c(Ec ￿ Uc) + d; (2)
where r is the discount rate, sc is the exogenous separation rate in sector c,
and R is a lump sum transfer that all individuals receive from the government
which re￿ ects that the government has some positive revenue requirements.
The parameter t is the proportional income tax. rUc is the average expected
return to an unemployed type c worker￿ s human capital during job search.
The unemployed worker receives the lump-sum transfer and the consump-
tion value of education. However, the person also has a unit probability of
becoming employed, ￿c, and thus to increase his or her value by (Ec ￿ Uc).
Equation (1) can be given a similar interpretation. In addition to the in-
stantaneous returns to employment given by the after tax wage, lump-sum
transfer and the consumption value of education, an employed worker faces
a risk of loosing his or her job, sc, and thus to experience a loss of (Ec ￿Uc).
Workers who choose to acquire education of type e face e⁄ort costs which
depend negatively on their ability. The imputed monetary value of the indi-
vidual e⁄ort cost is denoted ￿(a), where a is the worker￿ s ability, a 2 [0;1]
and ￿0(a) < 0. Let Ue and Ee denote the expected present values of unem-
ployment and employment. The value functions for a worker with ability a
and type e education who is paid wei then reads:
rEei = R + wei (1 ￿ t) + se(Uei ￿ Eei) ￿ ￿(a); (3)
rUe = R + ￿e(Ee ￿ Ue) ￿ ￿(a); (4)
where se is the exogenous separation rate in sector e. It is straight forward
to interpret these equations in terms of asset equations in a similar fashion
as for type c workers.
Firms opening vacancies in sector j employ workers with the marginal
productivity yj: Their time unit probability of ￿lling a vacancy is qj. Let Jj
and Vj represent the expected present values of an occupied job and a vacant
job for ￿rms in sector j. The arbitrage equations for a speci￿c job paying
the wage wji and a vacant job in the sector j are:
rJji = yj ￿ wji (1 + z) + sj(Vj ￿ Jji); j = c;e; (5)
rVj = qj(Jj ￿ Vj) ￿ k; j = c;e; (6)
7where z is the payroll tax rate and k denotes vacancy costs. As a ￿lled job is
an asset owned by the ￿rm, equation (5) captures the rate of return to this
asset. The rate of return is the instantaneous pro￿t made from having this
job being ￿lled, but the ￿rms also face a risk of loosing its worker, sj, and
thus to face the loss (Jj ￿ Vj). For a vacant job the rate of return is given
by the vacancy cost, k, but also the unit probability of ￿nding a worker, qj,
so to ￿ll this vacancy and make a capital gain of (Jj ￿ Vj).
Individual wages, wci and wei, are determined by individual Nash Bargain-
ing. More speci￿cally we solve Maxwji (Eji ￿ Uj)
￿ (Jji ￿ Vj)
1￿￿, j = c;e,
where ￿ denotes the workers￿bargaining power. The ￿rst order conditions




is the tax wedge, and where we have imposed symmetry and the free entry
condition, Vj = 0, j = c;e.
We can solve for the bargained wage by using this ￿rst order condition
and equations (1)-(6), assuming free entry, that is Vj = 0, and a symmetric
equilibrium. The bargained wage is given by:
!j = wj (1 + z) = ￿ (yj + ￿jk); j = c;e; (7)
where !j is the producer wage in sector j. The solution for labour market
tightness in sector j; can be derived from equations (5) and (6), using the
free entry condition and the expression for !j:
k (r + sj)
q (￿j)
= (1 ￿ ￿)yj ￿ ￿￿jk; j = c;e: (8)
The sectorial producer wage then follows residually from equation (7).
We assume that ye ￿ yc and sc ￿ se with a strict inequality in at least one
of the two expressions. From equation (7) and (8) we obtain the result that
labour market tightness and producer wages are higher in sector e, ￿e > ￿c
and !e > !c. Furthermore, as payroll taxes and income taxes are equal in
the two sectors, then consumer wages, wj must also be higher in sector e
than in sector c, we (1 ￿ t) > wc (1 ￿ t).
Steady state unemployment rates for the two types of workers are derived





; j = c;e: (9)
Hence, as a higher labour market tightness in sector e corresponds to
a higher transition rate for workers searching for employment in sector e;
￿e > ￿c, and sc ￿ se; then the unemployment rate is higher in sector c than
in sector e., i.e., ue < uc.
2.2 Education and unemployment
When a worker decides on which type of education to acquire, he or she
compares the value as a type c worker to the value as a type e worker.
The workers could compare the value of unemployment, employment, or a
weighted average of both, of being a type c worker to the equivalent value of
being a type e worker. To simplify the exposition, we will assume that the
discount rate approaches zero. This assumption is of no importance for the
results, but it is convenient as it does not matter whether we compare the
value of unemployment, employment or a weighted average of both, between
the two types of education.
Workers carefully consider the consequences of their choice of educational
direction in a number of dimensions. For example, they compare the expected
unemployment spells of the two types of educations. Moreover, they account
for di⁄erences in the after tax wage of the two types of educational directions.
In addition, they account for that type c education is associated with a
positive consumption value whereas education of type e requires e⁄ort. As
ability di⁄ers across individuals, educational costs associated with type e
education di⁄ers. This implies that workers with low ability may ￿nd it too
costly in terms of e⁄ort to acquire education of type e.
The marginal worker has an ability level, ^ a, which makes him or her just
indi⁄erent between acquiring education of type c and education of type e. We
can write the condition determining the ability level of the marginal worker
as5:
rUc = rUe (^ a): (10)
Using the arbitrage equations, (1)-(4) we can write this condition as
(1 ￿ uc)wc (1 ￿ t) + d = (1 ￿ ue)we (1 ￿ t) ￿ ￿(^ a); (11)
5Recall that rUj = rEj = ArUj +(1 ￿ A)rEj when the discount rate approaches zero,
for j = c;e and the weight A.
9The lower unemployment rate, and the higher take home pay, in sector e
induces individuals to choose type e education rather than type c education.
On the other hand, since type c education holds a direct consumption value
and type e education requires e⁄ort, this induces individuals to choose type c
education.
Alternatively to the above approach, we can use equations (2) and (4)
in equation (10) and then the ￿rst order conditions for Nash Bargaining
following by equation (6) after imposing the free entry condition, Vj = 0;j =







(￿e ￿ ￿c) ￿ d: (12)
This equation gives ^ a as a function of the endogenous variables ￿c and ￿e.
As ￿c and ￿e are determined in equation (8), where ￿e ￿ ￿c > 0, ^ a and 1 ￿ ^ a
resolve the number of workers acquiring type c education and the number
of workers acquiring education of type e. Workers with a ￿ ^ a; choose to
acquire education of type c whereas workers with a > ^ a acquire education
of type e. From equation (12) it is clear that the individual￿ s choice of
educational type is independent of whether taxes are levied on ￿rms or on
workers. Any reallocation of the tax burden across the individual and the
￿rm is counteracted by adjustments in the pre-tax wage set in the bargains.
Conducting comparative statics on the allocation of workers across the
two types of education reveals that:
Proposition 1 Increased taxation induces some workers to reallocate their
choice of educational direction from type e towards type c, that is @^ a=@￿ > 0.
Proof. Di⁄erentiating equation (12) with respect to ^ a and ￿ gives the result
immediately as ￿j;j = c;e are una⁄ected by a change in ￿ and ￿0 (^ a) < 0.
Higher income taxes reduce the monetary return to both educational
types, while both the consumption value of type c education and the e⁄ort
cost of type e education are unchanged. As the monetary return to the edu-
cational types are reduced through the increased tax, non-monetary returns
become more important for the educational decision. It thus follows intu-
itively that some workers will reallocate their choice of educational direction
towards the type of education which is associated with a positive consump-
tion value and away from the type of education which is associated with
10e⁄ort costs. It is simply no longer worth while for these individual￿ s to ac-
quire type e education as the expected net of taxes wage premium no longer
fully compensates their e⁄ort costs.
Total unemployment is given by
U
TOT = ^ auc + (1 ￿ ^ a)ue: (13)
We have the following result.
Proposition 2 Increased taxation raises total unemployment, @UTOT=@￿ >
0.
Proof. Di⁄erentiating equation (13) with respect to ￿ gives @UTOT=@￿ =
^ a(uc ￿ ue)@^ a=@￿. Hence the result follows from proposition (1) and using
that uc > ue.
Total unemployment increases with higher tax rates simply because more
people choose to acquire education of type c where the unemployment rate
is higher. Lower tax rates will thus reduce total unemployment as it encour-
ages workers to choose an educational type associated with shorter expected
unemployment spells.
3 Welfare
This section is concerned with welfare analysis. We make use of a utilitar-
ian welfare function, which is obtained by adding all individuals￿and ￿rms￿
steady state ￿ ow values of welfare. The social welfare function is written as:





~ Wc = ucrUc + (1 ￿ uc)rEc + (1 ￿ uc)rJc + vcrVc; (15)
~ We = uerUe + (1 ￿ ue)rEe + (1 ￿ ue)rJe + verVe: (16)
The government budget restriction is
[^ a(1 ￿ uc)wc + (1 ￿ ^ a)(1 ￿ ue)we](t + z) = R; which can be written in terms
of producer wages as:
[^ a(1 ￿ uc)!c + (1 ￿ ^ a)(1 ￿ ue)!e](1 ￿ 1=￿) = R: (17)
11By making use of the asset equations for workers and ￿rms in the two
sectors, equations (1)-(6), imposing the ￿ ow equilibrium conditions,6 as well
as the government budget restriction in (17), and considering the case of no
discounting, i.e., r ! 0, we can write the welfare function as follows:





Wc = (1 ￿ uc)yc ￿ uc￿ck + d; (19)
We = (1 ￿ ue)ye ￿ ue￿ek ￿ ￿(a). (20)
Welfare increases in employment and productivity and decreases in va-
cancy costs. Furthermore, the consumption value tends to increase welfare
whereas educational costs tend to reduce welfare. With the assumption of
risk neutral individuals, we ignore distributional issues and hence wages will
not feature in the welfare function.
As is clear from (18), (19), and (20), the proportional tax rate can only
a⁄ect welfare through its impact on the allocation of workers across the two
educational types. The following condition determines the optimal allocation
of workers across the two types of education:
@SW
@ (1 ￿ ^ a)
= We (^ a
￿)￿Wc = (1 ￿ ue)!e ￿￿(^ a
￿)￿(1 ￿ uc)!c ￿d = 0; (21)
where ^ a￿ denotes the socially optimal educational allocation. Welfare raises
when more workers acquire education of type e whenever the number of
workers with educational direction e are too low from a welfare point of
view. Similarly, welfare falls as more workers acquire education of type e
when too many workers have education of type e from a welfare perspective.
This clearly follows by de￿nition as SW is concave in (1￿^ a) and reaches its
maximum when (1 ￿ ue)!e ￿ ￿(^ a￿) ￿ (1 ￿ uc)!c ￿ d = 0.
Comparing this socially optimal allocation of workers across the two edu-
cational types, equation (21), to the market solution given by equation (12)
gives the following result.
Proposition 3 The presence of taxation, i.e., ￿ > 1, induces too many
workers to choose educational type c, and thus too few workers to choose
6Flow equilibrium implies sj (1 ￿ uj) = ￿juj and qjvj = sj (1 ￿ uj).
12educational type e. Only when there are no taxation, i.e., ￿ = 1; will the pri-
vate allocation of workers across the two educational types equal the socially
optimal allocation.
Proof. The equation for the private solution for the educational direction,
(11) can be written as ((1 ￿ ue)!e ￿ (1 ￿ uc)!c)=￿ ￿ ￿(^ a) ￿ d = 0 by us-
ing that wj (1 ￿ t) = !j=￿. For ￿ > 1; the private solution of ^ a induces
@SW=@ (1 ￿ ^ a) > 0, that is, increasing 1 ￿ ^ a, would increase welfare. Only
when there are no taxation, i.e., ￿ = 1; will the private allocation of workers
across the two educational types equal the socially optimal allocation, i.e.,
^ a = ^ a￿.
By comparing the equation for the market allocation of workers across
the two types, it is clear that the proportional tax system distorts the in-
dividuals￿educational choices. Too few workers will choose the educational
direction which is associated with e⁄ort and too many workers will choose
the educational direction which is associated with a positive consumption
value.
When the government has a positive revenue requirement, R > 0, and
the government can only attain these with proportional tax rates, those
should be chosen as low as possible on order to minimize the distortion
in the educational allocation. Thus the tax rates should be set such that:
(t + z) = R=[^ a(1 ￿ uc)wc + (1 ￿ ^ a)(1 ￿ ue)we]. The higher the government
revenue requirement, the higher the tax rates and the more ine¢ cient will
the educational allocation be, and the lower will welfare be. See the appendix
for the formal set-up of the welfare maximization problem.
The ine¢ ciently low number of workers that choose education of type
e in the private solution in presence of proportional uniform taxation could
however be corrected by the use of other policy instruments. Potential policy
instruments are sector speci￿c payroll tax rates, di⁄erentiated tuition fees and
subsidies. These policy instruments are considered in turn in the following
two sections.
4 Di⁄erentiated tax rates
In this section we consider the option of using di⁄erentiated tax rates instead
of a uniform income tax. That is, we may have that the tax wedges are dif-
ferent in sector c and e, denoted as ￿c 6= ￿e due to either tc 6= te or zc 6=
13ze or both. Introducing sector speci￿c proportional taxation implies that we
allow the tax rates in the value functions to di⁄er. The equilibrium expres-
sions derived from the ￿rst order condition from the wage bargains now take
the form (￿=(1 ￿ ￿))Jj=￿j = Ej ￿ Uj where ￿j = (1 + zj)=(1 ￿ tj): As we
know from standard theory of imperfectly competitive labour markets, pro-
portional tax rates will not in￿ uence producer wages and the unemployment
rate.7 This holds also here, inducing that equations (7), (8) and (9) again
pin down the producer wage, tightness, and the unemployment rate for each
of the two sectors depending on the same exact parameter speci￿cation.
However, the consumer wages are a⁄ected by the tax rates, wj (1 ￿ tj) =
!j=￿j; which implies that also the allocation of workers across the two edu-
cational directions is a⁄ected. We can now write the equation determining













Hence, changes in the sector speci￿c tax rates a⁄ect the allocation of
workers across the education types. We can summarize the impact of di⁄er-
entiated taxation on the allocation of workers and on total unemployment in
the following proposition
Proposition 4 An increase in the taxation of workers in sector c, i.e., a
higher ￿c; or a reduction in the taxation of workers in sector e, i.e., a lower
￿e, induces less individuals to choose education of type c and more individuals
to choose education of type e. The total number of unemployed workers fall.
Proof. As ￿c and ￿e are determined by (8) independently of the tax rates,
we can from equation (22) derive @^ a=@￿c < 0 and @^ a=@￿e > 0. Dif-
ferentiating equation (13) with respect to ￿c and ￿e, respectively, gives
@UTOT
@￿c = (uc ￿ ue) @^ a
@￿c < 0; @UTOT
@￿e = (uc ￿ ue) @^ a
@￿e > 0.
Increasing the relative taxation on workers with an education associated
with a positive consumption value makes it less attractive to choose this
type of education. Some workers thus ￿nd it optimal to reallocate their
educational choice towards the educational type e; although this educational
type is associated with e⁄ort costs. As a larger fraction of the work force
choose an education which is associated with shorter expected unemployment
spells, total unemployment falls.
7See, for example, Pissarides 1998.
14Above we showed that di⁄erentiated tax rates a⁄ect the individuals￿
choices of educational type. Now let us consider whether or not it is op-
timal to impose di⁄erentiated tax rates from a welfare perspective. The
government budget restriction can now be written:
^ a(1 ￿ uc)!c (1 ￿ 1=￿c) + (1 ￿ ^ a)(1 ￿ ue)!e (1 ￿ 1=￿e) = R: (23)
Following the procedure set out before, it follows that the welfare function
again can be represented by equations (18)-(20). The only di⁄erence is that
the marginal worker who is indi⁄erent between the two types of education,
^ a, is now given by (22).
Thus we can derive the optimal degree of tax di⁄erentiation by maximiz-
ing the social welfare function given in (18)-(20) subject to the government
budget constraint (23) and the educational allocation of workers (22). Lower
tax rates in one sector can now be used to ￿nance higher tax rates in the
other sector. As the tax rates also in the case of di⁄erentiated tax rates a⁄ect
welfare only through the allocation of educational types, the optimal design
of tax policy follows by a direct comparison of the socially optimal allocation
of workers across the two educational types with the private allocation. The
question then emerges if the revenue requirement can be reaped while at the
same time di⁄erentiated tax rates can be used to correct for the fact that
proportional uniform tax rates tends to induce too many workers to choose
educational type c. The result is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The optimal tax policy implies relatively higher tax rates in
sector c; such that the socially optimal allocation of workers across the two













Corollary. The optimal tax di⁄erentiation between the two sectors in-





The proof is given in the appendix.
As argued above, uniform proportional taxation induces too many work-
ers to choose an educational type with a positive consumption value, and
too few workers choose an educational type with e⁄ort costs. It is optimal
for the government to correct for this distortion by imposing di⁄erentiated
tax rates, such that the educational type with a positive consumption value
faces a higher tax rate. The optimal degree of tax di⁄erentiation increases in
the government revenue requirement. As was clear from the previous section,
15the welfare loss due to tax induced distortions to the individual￿ s educational
choice is larger the higher the tax rates. A higher degree of tax di⁄erenti-
ation is then required to counteract the larger distortion that follows from
high government revenue requirements.8
5 Di⁄erentiated subsidies and tuition fees
This section considers the impact of tuition fees and subsidies on the choice
of educational direction, unemployment, and welfare. First, we introduce
tuition fees which are denoted gj, j = c;e. Uniform tuition fees correspond to
the case gc = ge. For simplicity we introduce tuition fees for educational type
c by rede￿ning d as d = ￿ d￿gc where ￿ d is rede￿ned as the positive consumption
value of education of type c. Analogously, tuition fees for educational type e
is introduced by replacing the individual speci￿c costs of education of type
e with ￿(a) + ge.
Although these tuition fees are imputed into the equations as ￿ ow values,
the interpretations could either be that the tuition fees are paid back as annu-
ities or paid only during the time in education. This follows as a model where
people continuously are being born and dying generate the same qualitative
results.
Equivalently to the previous analysis, the tuition fees gc and ge do not
enter into the equations determining tightness, unemployment rate, and pro-
ducer wages. This holds as they are state independent. The tuition fees do
however a⁄ect the choice of educational direction. The condition determining






(￿e ￿ ￿c) + (gc ￿ ge) ￿ ￿ d: (24)
We can summarize the impact of tuition fees on the allocation of workers
across the two educational types and on total unemployment in the following
proposition:
8One can note that the optimal policy design given by proposition 5 is independent of
the Hosios condition. This follows intuitively from the fact that tightness and unemploy-
ment is una⁄ected by the tax rates. If the Hosios condition does not hold, that is ￿ 6= ￿,
the private outcomes induce an ine¢ cient number of unemployed workers in each sector.
This ine¢ ciency can however not be corrected for by use of the tax instruments as these
have no impact on the unemployment rates. Thus the optimal tax policy is determined
independently of the Hosios condition.
16Proposition 6 An increased tuition fee for individuals who acquire educa-
tion c, i.e., a higher gc, or a reduction in the tuition fee for individuals who
acquire education e, i.e., a lower ge, induces less individuals to choose type c
education and more individuals to choose type e education. The total num-
ber of unemployed workers fall. With uniform tuition fees, gc = ge, general
changes in the tuition fees have no impact on educational allocation and the
number of unemployed workers.
Proof. As ￿c and ￿e are determined by equation (8) which is independent
of the tax rates, from equation (24) we derive @^ a=@gc < 0 and @^ a=@ge > 0.
Di⁄erentiating equation (13) with respect to gc and ge gives @UTOT=@gc =
(uc ￿ ue)@^ a=@gc < 0, @UTOT=@ge = (uc ￿ ue)@^ a=@ge > 0:
Acquiring education c becomes relatively less attractive when tuition fees
for type c education increase or tuition fees for type e education fall. This
induces more people to choose education of type e; which clearly reduces
total unemployment as people reallocate towards the sector where the unem-
ployment rate is lower.
Finally, optimal tuition fees are considered. Following the same procedure
as in Section 3 and using the government budget restriction ^ agc+(1 ￿ ^ a)ge+
[^ a(1 ￿ uc)!c + (1 ￿ ^ a)(1 ￿ ue)!e](1 ￿ 1=￿) = R provide us with the welfare
function in (18)-(20) with the small modi￿cation that equation (19) is rewrit-
ten as Wc = (1 ￿ uc)yc ￿ uc￿ck + ￿ d. Not very surprisingly we ￿nd that:
Proposition 7 In case ￿ > 1, the optimal tuition design involves higher
tuition fees for workers who acquire education type c relative to workers
who acquire education type e. The optimal solution of tuition fees are then
(gc ￿ ge)
￿ = ((1 ￿ ue)!e ￿ (1 ￿ uc)!c)(1 ￿ 1=￿) > 0 and implies that the
socially optimal educational allocation is attained. In case ￿ = 1, and the gov-
ernment instead uses tuition fees to retain the revenue requirement, R > 0,
it is optimal to use uniform tuition fees: (gc ￿ ge)
￿ = 0:
The Proof is given in the Appendix.
The distortion created by the untaxed consumption values and e⁄ort costs
may be corrected for by letting the tuition fees for type c education exceed
the tuition fee for type e education. The socially optimal allocation can
therefore be implemented by letting gc > ge. However, the presence of tuition
fees in this simple setting provides an alternative instrument for ￿nancing
government expenditures. Thus the socially optimal allocation of educational
types can also be reached by having no taxes and uniform tuition fees.
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A similar analysis may be carried out if we assume that the government
can choose to subsidize one type of education. Not surprisingly, we ￿nd
that it is optimal for the government to subsidize educations that requires
larger e⁄ort. Such a subsidy simply corrects for the distortion that too
many workers tend to choose the educational type which is associated with
a positive consumption value.
6 Discussion
We have shown in a two-sector equilibrium model that the presence of taxes
can distort the individual￿ s educational choice and induce too many individ-
uals to choose the educational type with lower expected wage return. These
individuals value the consumption value of this educational type higher than
the additional wage return they could have received by choosing the alter-
native educational type. Taxes reduces the price on the consumption value
of education, measured in foregone income by not choosing the alternative
investment that generates higher wage return. We also show that this dis-
tortion is larger the higher the tax level.
18Data9 for the OECD countries is consistent with this view. From Figure
1 we see that there is a positive correlation between the level of taxation in
a country (measured as tax revenue as percentage of GDP) and the share of
tertiary education graduates who major in education, humanities, health and
welfare. These types of higher education often lead to professions that are
relatively low paid compared with for instance engineering and science. This
is particularly prevalent in the Scandinavian countries, which are egalitarian
societies characterized by large public sectors, high tax levels, and full sub-
sidizing of higher education. The individuals￿educational choices determine
the skill composition of the labour force and thus also the countries￿future
production possibilities. The individuals have full freedom of choice prior to
the education, while there is a certain lock-in e⁄ect when the education is
completed.
In our model individuals di⁄er in ability, which again determines the non-
deductible e⁄ort costs of completing type e education. Type c education is
characterized by a higher consumption value, which is a tax free return to
that type of education. Sector e has lower unemployment and higher wage
return than sector c. High ability individuals choose educational type e,
since they have relatively low e⁄ort costs of completing this education, such
that the higher monetary return to the educational type more than compen-
sates for the foregone consumption value of type c education. Low ability
individuals have high e⁄ort costs of completing type e education, and they
will instead choose type c education and enjoy the higher consumption value
of that educational type. Wage taxes reduce the wage return to education
while leaving the consumption value of type c education and the e⁄ort cost
of type e education unchanged. They reduce the overall return to type e
education relatively more than the overall return to type c education. This
distorts the educational choice of the marginal individuals, inducing too able
individuals to choose type c education. As unemployment is higher in sector
c, this increases total unemployment in the economy and reduces welfare.
Di⁄erentiated taxation could be used to correct for this distortion. Higher
pay-roll taxes in sector c indirectly taxes the consumption value of type c
education, inducing less individuals to choose that education, which again
reduces unemployment and increases welfare. The same result is reached
by introducing di⁄erentiated tuition fees with a higher tuition fee on type c
education.
9OECD Education at a Glance, 2004, and OECD Economic Outlook, 2003.
19We therefore argue that part of the high concentration of graduates in
humanities in countries like the Scandinavian could be tax induced, and it
may be important to correct for this distortion in order to secure an optimal
skill combination of the future labour force. One way to correct for this is to
induce sector speci￿c tax rates, such that professions that apply humanities
graduates are taxed at a higher tax rate. This would reduce the wage return
to humanities further, inducing some individuals to switch to other types of
education. However, this may not be a politically feasible solution, since it
would imply implementation of higher tax rates in lower paid sectors which
furthermore are characterized by high unemployment. A more feasible policy
tool may be to introduce di⁄erentiated tuition fees, where educational types
with a high element of consumption requires higher tuition fees, such that
individuals pay part of the price of their private educational consumption.
Other educational types, where recruitment is low because of a higher re-
quired e⁄ort to complete it or a relatively low consumption value, can be
made more attractive by having low or negative tuition fees. Or equivalent
introduce more generous re-payment schemes to student loans taken when
acquiring education associated with higher required e⁄ort. In this way, the
government is able to give strong incentives for the educational types that are
important for the countries skill portfolio, but that are less popular among
the students.
7 Conclusion
Many individuals choose educational directions that o⁄er jobs in sectors with
relatively high unemployment and relatively low wages. This is an apparent
paradox if one only considers education as an investment that yields higher
wages in the future. But by considering higher education both as investment
and as consumption, these educational choices become understandable and
rational. Some individuals have such a high consumption value of a particular
education that they are willing to forego the future earnings that they could
have received by choosing an alternative type of education. The price of the
consumption value of their preferred education is the after tax wage increase
they forego. High income taxes thus reduce the price on the consumption
value of education. One would thus expect that individuals in countries with
high taxes and broad welfare states put more emphasis on the consumption
value when making their educational choice and less emphasis on the wage
20return. As we saw in the discussion part, we provided some evidence that
this may be the case.
We show that this tax induced distortion in the individual￿ s educational
choice to some extent can be neutralized by introducing di⁄erentiated tax
rates or di⁄erentiated tuition fees. These tools induce some individuals to
choose the alternative educational type with low consumption value and high
e⁄ort costs in order to enjoy the better future employment possibilities of this
education. This reduces total unemployment and increases welfare, and it
improves and broadens the aggregated skill portfolio of the country.
Individuals in our framework are heterogenous in the sense that they
di⁄er in ability, such that the e⁄ort costs of completing the educational type
that leads to jobs in the sector with better employment prospects vary across
individuals. But they all have the same preferences, such that they have the
same valuation of the consumption values of the two types of education. An
interesting extension would be to allow individuals to be heterogenous both
regarding ability and consumption value of di⁄erent educational types.
Finally, one can note that this paper only considers the tax induced dis-
tortion on the choice of educational type. This focus was a natural departure
as we wanted to shed light on a new type of distortion, which, in addition,
may become increasingly important in the process of globalization. A natural
extension would, however, be to account for that taxes may also distort the
choice between attaining higher education or not, as well as the allocation
of time between leisure and work, and the allocation between leisure and
search.
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237.1 Appendix
The assumption of uniformely distribution of ability, a, imposes
no loss of generality. Suppose that e ￿(e a) is an e⁄ort function where
e a is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F: Let
a = F(e a); and de￿ne ￿(a) as ￿(a) = e ￿(F ￿1(a)): Since F(e a) is uniformely
distributed, it follows that e ￿(e a) = ￿(a):
The formal set-up of the welfare maximization problem: Con-
sidering the optimal tax level, the formal set-up of the welfare maximization
problem is: Max￿ SW given by (18), (19), and (20) subject to the govern-
ment budget restriction (17). With a positive revenue requirement, R > 0, we
have (t + z) ￿ R=[^ a(1 ￿ uc)wc + (1 ￿ ^ a)(1 ￿ ue)we] > 0. Then dSW=d￿ =
dSW=d^ a ￿ d^ a=@￿ < 0. Thus the budget restriction must be binding in case
the only available tax instrument is proportional uniform taxation. Thus the
optimal tax rates satisfy: (t + z) = R=[^ a(1 ￿ uc)wc + (1 ￿ ^ a)(1 ￿ ue)we];
where ^ a is the allocation determined by the private solution) given these tax
rates. Clearly one can speculate over extreme solutions for the tax rates if the
revenue requirement is extremely high. For example, an extremely high tax
rate would induce all individuals to choose educational direction c. The ed-
ucational choice is then solely based on the access to a positive consumption
value of educational type c.
Proof of proposition 5 and the corollary. Maximize the social wel-
fare function in (18)-(20) with respect to ￿c given that ￿e is implicitly de￿ned
as a function of ￿c, i.e., ￿e = f (￿c), from the government budget restriction





(1￿uc)!c; provides a maximum point of the welfare func-
tion; i.e., @SW=@￿c = @SW=@^ a ￿ @^ a=@￿c = 0 and @2SW=@￿
2
c < 0. This
solution also assures that the government budget restriction is ful￿lled. Sub-
stitute the welfare maximizing relationship between the sectorial tax wedges,
1 ￿ 1=￿c =
(1￿ue)!e
(1￿uc)!c (1 ￿ 1=￿e), into the government budget restriction (23)






From this expression it is clear that the revenue requirement, R, can be
reaped by the appropriate level of the tax rates, i.e., ￿e, given the opti-





(1￿ue)!e￿R, which is substituted into the expression




(1￿uc)!c￿R. Substitute these so-
cially optimal tax rates into the private outcome of educational allocation,














e; !c < !e; and




@R > 0 as long as (1 ￿ uc)!c > R:
Proof of proposition 7. Maximize the social welfare function in (18)-
(20) with respect to gc given that ge is implicitly de￿ned as a function of gc,
i.e., ge = h(gc), from the government budget restriction ^ agc + (1 ￿ ^ a)ge +
[^ a(1 ￿ uc)!c + (1 ￿ ^ a)(1 ￿ ue)!e](1 ￿ 1=￿) = R. The solution of the rela-
tionship between gc and ge, (gc ￿ ge)
￿ = ((1 ￿ ue)!e ￿ (1 ￿ uc)!c)(1 ￿ 1=￿),
provides a maximum point of the welfare function; i.e., @SW=@gc = @SW=@^ a￿
@^ a=@gc = 0 and @2SW=@g2
c < 0. This relationship induces a socially optimal
allocation of educational type in the economy. This can be seen by compar-
ing the equation determining the private allocation, equation (11) rewritten
as (1 ￿ uc)!c=￿ + ￿ d ￿ gc = (1 ￿ ue)!e=￿ ￿ ￿(^ a) ￿ ge to the social opti-
mal allocation of workers across educational types, equation (21), which is
rewritten as (1 ￿ ue)!e ￿ ￿(^ a￿) ￿ (1 ￿ uc)!c ￿ ￿ d = 0. Substitute the opti-
mal relationship for the tuition fees into the government budget restriction
yields: ge = R ￿ (1 ￿ 1=￿)(1 ￿ ue)!e. For a given level of ￿ > 0, the gov-
ernment revenue can thus be reaped by this choice of ge. If ￿ = 1 then the
optimal solution is (gc ￿ ge)
￿ = 0: The government budget restriction can in
this case be written as ^ agc + (1 ￿ ^ a)ge = R, or as g = R making use of that
gc = ge = g: The uniform tuition fee then works as a lump-sum tax, which
in this case is distributed as a lump-sum transfer.
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